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The focus of this paper is on regulatory reforms towards rule-based regulation. 
The theory of monopolistic bottlenecks is contrasted with the concept of essen-
tial facilities and the so-called three-criteria test. It is important to differentiate 
between efficient private bargaining of access conditions among competitive 
networks and regulated third party access to monopolistic bottlenecks. Regula-
tion of infrastructure access charges should be limited exclusively to price-
capping. In order to avoid the problem of extensive discretionary behavior of 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
Since the abolishment of legal entry barriers in network industries effective 
competition became a key topic in regulatory economics. When the debate on 
the possibilities of privatization and deregulation started in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the primary focus was on active and potential competition in the 
markets for network services. Whereas the focus of the theory of contestable 
markets concentrates on the role of potential competition with identical cost 
functions for both active and potential competitors (Panzar, Willig, 1977), com-
petition in the markets for  network services does not only mean potential com-
petition. As soon as competition works, the behaviour of markets for network 
services becomes more complex than is assumed in the model of the theory of 
contestable markets. Examples may be strategies of product differentiation, 
price differentiation, creation of goodwill etc. However, even strategic behav-
iour on competitive markets for network services should not lead to the opposite 
conclusion to regulate these markets. In contrast, the goal of the disaggregated 
regulatory approach is the development of the preconditions for effective com-
petition on the markets for network services.  
 
The focus of this paper is on the division of labor between competition policy 
and regulatory interventions. Whereas competitive policy aims to intervene once 
anti-competitive conduct has been identified, the focus of sector-specific regula-
tion is on ex-ante regulatory provisions before an abuse of market power has 
taken place. Ex-ante regulation is only justified in those kinds of network areas 
where a systematic abuse of market power is likely in the absence of regulation. 
 
The potentials of phasing out sector-specific regulation are of particular relev-
ance within the telecommunications sector (Knieps, 1997). In 1999, an EU re-
view started with the aim of maximising the application of general European 
competition law, the minimisation of sector-specific regulation, a rigorous phas-
ing out of unnecessary regulation and the introduction of ‘sunset’ clauses. Nev-
ertheless, the unspecific regulatory obligations based on the EU directives in the   2 
1999 review package – in particular the Framework Directive
1 and the Access 
Directive
2  –  resulted in a tangle of contradictory decisions and statements 
(Knieps, 2005, 78). The Commission’s guidelines
3
 
 do not present a clear and 
economically well-founded concept for localising network-specific market 
power. Criteria like relative market share, financial strength, access to input and 
service markets and so forth can only serve as a starting point for evaluating the 
existence of market power, but the development of an ex ante regulatory crite-
rion creates a need for a more clear-cut definition of market power. Neverthe-
less, in the meantime the process of phasing out sector-specific regulation gains 
increasing momentum (Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2010). 
In the following the question is considered, whether and to what extent sector-
specific regulation is essentially a transitional phenomenon, or whether impor-
tant differences can be found between the individual sectors. In this respect, a 
distinction needs to be drawn between the normative and the positive theory of 
regulation. The normative theory of regulation stipulates criteria that can be used 
to judge which network areas need to be regulated (regulatory basis), which in-
struments can achieve this most effectively (regulatory instruments), and when 
regulation needs to be abandoned. These criteria need to be applied symmetri-
cally across the network industries. They should therefore not apply only to one 
single sector but to all network sectors. The positive theory of regulation analyz-
es the development, modification and elimination of sector-specific regulation. 
The regulatory mandate is defined by transferring regulatory competencies from 
a legislative body to a regulatory authority.  
 
                                                 
1   Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services (Framework Directive), OJ 2002 L 108/33. 
2   Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities 
(Access Directive), OJ 2002 L 108/7. 
3   See Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant 
market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communi-
cations network and services, OJ 2002 C 165/6-31.   3 
2.  Regulatory reforms towards rule-based regulation 
 
2.1  The theory of monopolistic bottlenecks  
 
The theory of monopolistic bottlenecks is central to the disaggregated regulatory 
approach in terms of locating network-specific market power to determine the 
minimum basis for regulation (Knieps, 1997, 327-331). The aim is to come up 
with a coherent basis for access regulation consistent with network economics 
which can be applied to all network sectors and which regardless of historical or 
institutional quirks provides justification for ex ante regulatory measures. For 
the remaining competitive network areas the application of general competition 
law is sufficient.   
 
The conditions governing a monopolistic bottleneck are met when: 
(1)  a facility is necessary for reaching customers, i.e. if no second or third 
such facility exists, in other words if there is no active substitute. This is 
the case when due to economies of scale and economies of scope a natural 
monopoly exists and a single provider is able to make the facility avail-
able more cheaply than several providers; 
(2)  at the same time the facility cannot reasonably be duplicated as a way of 
controlling the active provider, in other words when there is no potential 
substitute. This is the case when the costs of the facility are irreversible.  
 
Consequently, network-specific market power is only to be expected in those 
parts of networks which are characterised by a natural monopoly and irreversi-
ble costs. Although irreversible costs are no longer relevant for the decision-
making of the established enterprises, potential competitors must decide whether 
to invest in such irreversible costs or not. Established firms therefore have lower 
decision-relevant costs than their potential rivals. This means there is room for 
strategic behaviour, with the result that inefficient production or profits no 
longer necessarily enable newcomers to enter the market. The market power of 
the firm that enjoys such a monopolistic bottleneck is therefore stable, even if all   4 
market players are fully informed, all users are prepared to switch to another 
provider, and small price adjustments have an effect on demand. 
 
 
2.2  Monopolistic bottlenecks and the concept of essential facilities 
 
When applying rule-based regulation in order to discipline network-specific 
market power, the concept of essential facilities is of crucial importance. This 
concept suggests the connection to the essential facilities doctrine, derived from 
US antitrust law, which is meanwhile being increasingly applied in European 
competition law also. The doctrine states that a facility is only to be regarded as 
essential if the following conditions are fulfilled: entry to the complementary 
market is not effectively possible without access to this facility; it is not possible 
for a supplier on a complementary market to duplicate this facility at a reason-
able expense, and there are also no substitutes (Areeda, Hovenkamp, 1988). 
 
In the context of the disaggregated regulatory approach the essential facilities 
doctrine is no longer applied case by case – as is common in US antitrust law – 
but to an entire class of cases, namely, monopolistic bottleneck facilities charac-
terised by a combination of natural monopoly and irreversible costs in the rele-
vant range of demand. The design of non-discriminatory conditions of access to 
essential facilities must be specified in the context of the disaggregated regula-
tory approach. It is important in this context to view the application of the essen-
tial facilities doctrine in a dynamic context. Therefore, an objective for the for-
mulation of access conditions must be to not obstruct infrastructure competition 
by regulatory micro-management, but rather create incentives for the symmetric 
development of infrastructure and service competition by rule-based regulation. 
 
 
2.3  Monopolistic bottlenecks and the three criteria test 
 
In the context of European telecommunications policy, in February 2003 the 
European Commission recommended the so-called three criteria test. This test   5 
seems to substantiate the requirements for regulatory intervention. The Commis-
sion summarises the three criteria as follows: 
“The first criterion is the presence of high and non-transitory entry barri-
ers whether of structural, legal or regulatory nature. … [T]he second crite-
rion admits only those markets, the structure of which does not tend to-
wards effective competition within the relevant time horizon. … The third 
criterion is that application of competition law alone would not adequately 




Thus, it can be concluded that within the EU telecommunications regulatory 
framework an intention to avoid over-regulation with respect to new markets 
can be observed. However, an economic approach to the remaining need for sec-
tor-specific regulation is still missing. In order to provide a consistent regulatory 
framework, the three criteria in the Commission’s Recommendation of February 
2003 have to be rewritten in economic terms, applying the theory of monopolis-
tic bottlenecks (Blankart, Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2007, 423 ff.). After entry liber-
alization of network industries, high and non-transitory entry barriers are only 
present, when a monopolistic bottleneck infrastructure exists. Markets do not 
tend towards effective competition within the relevant time horizon as long as a 
natural monopoly in combination with sunk costs is stable over a foreseeable 
future without phasing out potential. The question whether the application of 
competition law alone would adequately address the market failure(s) concerned 
raises the question whether ex ante or ex post intervention is more efficient.  
 
 
   
                                                 
4   Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service 
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regula-
tion in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks 
and services (2003/311/EC), OJ 2003 L 114/45-49, recital 9.   6 
3  Disaggregated monopolistic bottleneck regulation  
 
3.1  The need to regulate third party access 
 
It is important to differentiate between efficient private bargaining of access 
conditions among competitive networks and regulated third party access to mo-
nopolistic bottlenecks. Competition fulfils the function of mitigating market 
power. It can be expected that private bargaining of access conditions between 
the different network owners under competition will lead to economically effi-
cient solutions. Strategic behaviour can be excluded, because every bargaining 
partner can easily be substituted by an alternative (potential) network carrier. 
Private bargaining solutions on access conditions among network carriers under 
competition are not only beneficial for the carriers themselves but in particular 
improve the market performance of the network services provided to the cus-
tomers. Independent of the market size of the carriers involved, inefficient sup-
pliers of access services are rapidly confronted with strongly decreasing market 
shares due to the strong pressure of alternative (potential) network service pro-
viders.  
 
In order to allow active and potential competition on service markets non-
discriminatory access to monopolistic bottleneck infrastructures is necessary. To 
the extent that a monopolistic bottleneck is observable, ex ante regulation should 
be in place; otherwise the evolution of service markets will be hampered. Inno-
vative ways of access to existing bottlenecks should be guaranteed in order to 
allow the evolvement of new service markets.  
 
There remains the problem that monopolistic bottleneck infrastructures may be 
involved. Illustrative examples are railway systems, where competitive suppliers 
of transportation services need access to the tracks and railway stations. In con-
trast to rail services, railway tracks must be regarded as a natural monopoly with 
sunk costs, which cannot be shifted to another market. Therefore, if a potential 
competitor would plan to enter with a parallel track, the incumbent railway 
owner could reasonably claim to reduce his tariffs to short-run variable costs. As 
soon as a railway network is completed, one therefore cannot expect further en-  7 
tries with additional tracks. The decision-relevant costs of entry include the costs 
of tracks, which could not be covered by tariffs based on short-run variable 
costs. In contrast to the supplier of rail services, the established track owner has 
obtained market power. A similar situation holds for other network infrastruc-
tures, such as airports, electricity and gas networks. 
 
In contrast to access to competitive networks, the market power involved in mo-
nopolistic bottlenecks fundamentally disturbs such bargaining processes. One 
extreme alternative could be (vertical) foreclosure of competitors on a comple-
mentary service market. Such a tying can be used as a method of price discrimi-
nation, enabling a monopolist to earn higher profits. Another way of abusing 
market power within the bargaining process on access conditions is to provide 
insufficient network access quality or require excessive access charges. Exam-
ples for insufficient access quality may vary within the network sectors under 
consideration.  
 
So far the role of regulation has been considered from the perspective of intra-
modal competition. The question arises to what extent effective intermodal 
competition, e.g. the entry of low cost airlines, could restrict the market power 
of Deutsche Bahn AG (vgl. Bender, Götz, Pakula, 2010). There is no doubt that 
intermodal competition by trucks, cars, airlines can limit to some extent the 
profit potential of a railroad infrastructure provider. However, the goal of these 
new railway regulations in Germany is to stimulate active competition on the 
railroad service markets. Newcomers’ entry into the market for rail services 
broadens the range of services offered extensively as well as widening consum-
ers’ choices in terms of price and service quality. Opportunities for new entrants 
include the detection and exploitation of new train service networks, such as the 
development of a Europe-wide express service for passengers and goods based 
on a high-performance, computer-assisted logistics system. Mandatory access 
requirements to tracks are based on the intramodal perspective of train service 
companies; the decisive factor is the need for complementary service providers 
to have non-discriminatory access to the monopolistic railway infrastructure. 
 
   8 
3.2  Limiting regulation to monopolistic bottlenecks 
 
The effect of a total refusal of access to monopolistic bottleneck facilities can 
also be achieved by providing access only at prohibitively high tariffs. This 
shows that an effective application of the essential facilities doctrine must be 
combined with a suitable regulation of access conditions to bottlenecks with re-
gard to price, technical quality, and timeframe. However, the fundamental prin-
ciple of such a regulatory policy should be to strictly limit regulatory measures 
to those network areas where market power potential does indeed exist. A regu-
lation of access tariffs to monopolistic bottlenecks must therefore not lead to a 
regulation of tariffs in network areas without market power potential. There are 
two further issues that have to be taken into account: On the one hand, the exis-
tence of competition on the service level should not lead to the conclusion that 
there is no market power potential on the upstream network level, as long as the 
latter fulfils the criteria of a monopolistic bottleneck. On the other hand, there is 
the question of the  minimum regulatory depth necessary to guarantee non-
discriminatory access to essential facilities, without, however, disproportionately 
interfering with the property rights of the regulated firm.  
 
 
3.3  Price-cap regulation of access charges 
 
The reference point for regulatory rules concerning access charges should be the 
coverage of the full costs of the monopolistic bottleneck (in order to guarantee 
the viability of the facility). In particular, when alternatives to bypass essential 
facilities are absent, the cost-covering constraint may not be sufficient to fore-
stall excessive profits. Therefore the instrument of price-cap regulation should 
be introduced (Beesley, Littlechild, 1989). Its major purpose is to regulate the 
level of prices, taking into account the inflation rate (consumer price index) mi-
nus a percentage for expected productivity increase. It seems important to re-
strict such price-cap regulation to the bottleneck components of networks, where 
market power due to monopolistic bottlenecks is really creating a regulatory 
problem. In other subparts of networks price-setting should be left to the com-
petitive markets.    9 
Regulation of infrastructure access charges should be limited exclusively to 
price-capping. The basic principle underlying price-capping regulation is that 
price levels should be regulated in areas where there is network-specific market 
power. The benefits of price-capping in terms of efficiency improvements and 
future investment activities can only unfold, if price-capping is not combined 
with input-based profit regulation. Individual pricing agreements lead to over-
regulation which is harmful to competition. 
 
The question remains whether regulators should also be allowed to prescribe 
pricing rules focussing on tariff structures within monopolistic bottlenecks. 
There are serious arguments for regulators to refrain from detailed tariff regula-
tion. In the first place, firms should have the flexibility to design (Pareto supe-
rior) optional tariff schemes (Willig, 1978). Pricing rules prescribed by the regu-
lator could induce inefficient bypass activities. For example, a first pricing rule 
could be access tariffs according to the long-run average costs of the essential 
facility. Since in such a case a differentiation among different user groups ac-
cording to different price-elasticities is not possible, incentives for inefficient 
bypass of the bottleneck facility may be created for certain user groups. A sec-
ond pricing rule would be access pricing according to the Ramsey pricing prin-
ciple. Mark-ups on the marginal costs of access to the monopolistic bottlenecks 
are chosen according to the elasticity of demand for network access in order to 
maximize social welfare given the cost-covering constraint. However, Ramsey 
prices could become unsustainable, even if applied strictly to monopolistic bot-
tlenecks. The technological trend towards the unbundling of monopolistic bot-
tleneck components increases the possibilities for inefficient bypass. Secondly, 
the danger arises that regulators extend the regulatory basis to include the com-
petitive subparts of networks. From the point of view of increasing static (short-
run) efficiency such behaviour could even be justified by welfare theory. It is 
well known that efficiency distortions caused by applying Ramsey pricing can 
be reduced by extending the regulatory basis. Nevertheless, such an endeavour 
would in fact mean a return to fully regulated networks, including price and en-
try regulation of the competitive subparts. As such, this would not be a suitable 
response to deregulation (Damus, 1984).    10 
Regulatory authorities should not force firms to apply specific pricing rules, 
such as Ramsey prices or two-part tariffs, as this would hamper their quest for 
innovative pricing systems. It is always possible that better rules will evolve in 
the future. The design of pricing rules should be part of the decision-making 
process of the firms. 
 
 
4.  Towards a disaggregated regulatory mandate 
 
The statutory regulatory framework is defined within the political process in the 
form of laws and regulations. Sector-specific regulation is implemented by the 
authorities appointed by the legislator. When transferring regulatory competen-
cies from a legislative body to a regulatory authority, the regulatory authority’s 
future scope of responsibilities is also defined. This involves a regulatory 
mandate between the legislator (principal) and the regulatory authority (agent). 
The regulatory authority can be granted varying competencies in this respect 
(Knieps, 2007, p. 182). 
 
European telecommunications regulation is a clear example of how a vague reg-
ulatory mandate can systematically lead to overregulation. As has been pointed 
out, the phasing out process of sector-specific regulation gains increasing mo-
mentum. Nevertheless, due to the vague regulatory mandate of the EU regulato-
ry framework the EU Commission gained a large potential of regulatory discre-
tion. The markets which the Commission classified as potentially in need of 
regulation include service markets such as international and domestic telephone 
calls, leased lines and transit services that are undoubtedly competitive. The EU 
Directives are an ideal breeding ground for varied forms of discretionary inter-
vention, depending on the particular influences of the interest groups involved 
(Knieps, 2005, p.78) . 
 
In order to avoid the problem of extensive discretionary behavior of regulatory 
agencies the following disaggregated regulatory mandate should be imple-
mented. The legislator limits the regulatory authority’s discretionary behavior by 
means of the disaggregated regulatory mandate. Firstly, regulation is limited to   11 
areas with network-specific market power. End-to-end regulation, which also 
includes competitive areas, is incompatible with this principle. Secondly, when 
the network-specific market power disappears in a network area, say as a result 
of technical progress, regulation of this subarea must also be ended. Thirdly, 
non-discriminatory access to the monopolistic bottleneck facilities must be en-
sured. Incentive regulation must be restricted to monopolistic bottleneck com-
ponents. The disaggregated regulatory mandate also provides a binding restric-
tion on the regulatory authority’s competencies and consequently reduces its 
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